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The aim of the workshop Refining Trust: Palestine in Comparative 
Perspective was to discuss conditions, practices and environmental 
contexts that enable conflicting parties to achieve a peaceful solution, 
and consider how such conditions might be transferrable to the 
current case of Palestine. The event, organised by Ralf Wűstenberg 
and Colin H. Williams, both Senior Research Associates of  the Von 
Hügel Institute (VHI) and supported by the DAAD-University of 
Cambridge Research Hub for German Studies with funds from the 
German Federal Foreign Office (FFO), brought together scholars and 
practitioners with expertise in different country-specific cases of 
political reconciliation post-1989, with a particular focus on German 
reunification, and also including the cases of Northern Ireland, 
Rwanda and the Republic of South Africa.  
 
The Chair and Rapporteur, Professor Colin H. Williams, welcomed the 
participants and expressed his thanks, on behalf of the VHI, for their 
willingness to engage in this most challenging of themes. 
 
He thanked the VHI Director Dr Philip McCosker and Dr Lidia 
Ripamonti for their hosting of the workshop and Professor Ralf 
Wüstenberg who devised the programme of speakers, together with 
his colleague at Europa-Universität Flensburg, Thies Münchow, who 
provided organisational assistance. 
 
He then acknowledged the financial support of the three sponsors the 
VHI, Cambridge University, the DAAD Cambridge and the Europa-
Universität Flensburg. 
 
The workshop opened by discussing the principal focus of the 
meeting, namely Palestine in comparative perspective. 
 
The Case of Palestine-History and Vision 
Speaker Dr Zeina Barakat, Friedrich-Schiller Universität, Jena 
Dr Barakat provided a powerful and penetrating account of the 
vicissitudes of the Arab-Israeli conflict which highlighted the legacy of 
imperial and colonial rule and their promised outcomes, many of 
which were unfulfilled. Illustration of the impact of the various military 
interventions, regional conflagrations, attempted solutions and on-
going sources of tension was enriched by a selective use of political 
texts and maps. 
 
The basics of life, such as water, the need for land and security, access 
to education and individual mobility, were set in sharp contrast to 
another layer of meaning, namely the religious and ideological filters 
by which Palestinian-Israeli relations were mediated. The 
presentation gave a vital summary of the obstacles to peace and 
enumerated the key concessions which both sides to the dispute were 
required to make before fundamental trust could be established. A 
warning was given that active negotiations and the construction of 
bridges for mutual respect and trust could not wait for the conflict to 
be over, but rather that engagement should proceed forthwith. 
 
The presentation appealed to the conflicting participants to bear in 
mind their responsibility to future generations, not just the immediate 
and often cynically-motivated short-term episodes of violence and 
revenge. The speaker ended on a note of optimism by providing her 
own personal vision of what the next decade might bring in terms of 
gradual reconciliation. 
 
Respondent Abu El-Ezz, An-Najah National University, Nablus, 
Palestine 
Acting as respondent to the opening paper, Dr Abu El-Ezz argued that 
he was unable to share such optimism although he found the 
presentation provocative. After reminding us about the troubled 
history of the Palestinian people, he argued that real peace could only 
be built upon justice, but such justice was largely absent at present for 
Palestinians effectively occupied a set of spaces which acted in effect 
as an open prison. He illustrated the daily round of difficulties which 
individual residents experienced in a variety of spheres, especially 
internal and external travel restrictions. 
 
The issue of continued occupation of the land, growing settlements, 
and control of water continue to animate debates and grievances and 
until such time as these were resolved or substantially improved he 
did not envisage that there was much common ground for lasting 
dialogue. Above all whilst the people no longer construct or control 
their own borders, their own trajectory, there is little ground for 
reconciliation. To do otherwise he argued was seen as a sign of 
weakness, so that to accept the permanent condition of eretz Israel as 
it stands, is a denial of Palestine’s right to exist as a legitimate polity.  
From his perspective it is a zero-sum game, not a transitional process 
towards a shared, common future. While the occupied territories are 
legitimised as authentic Israeli spaces, then historical claims to land, 
resources, space and habitats by Palestinians are either downplayed 
or dismissed. The resultant narrative constructed is a partial and 
fragmented set of interpretations provided by some experts in the 
international community which does not recognise the basic source of 
grievance, namely dispossession from one’s own homeland. 
 
The Chair invited the South African Ambassador to Palestine, Ashraf Y 
Suliman to comment further based on his daily experience of living 
and working in the territory. He outlined four necessary preconditions, 
based on the South African experience, before Palestinian-Israeli 
negotiations could resume. With reference to radical change in a 
number of other contexts and the destiny of key players within the 
Middle East, he argued that the absence of a well-developed value 
system which was conducive to peace was the principal barrier to 
long-term Palestinian development and suggested that the 
emergence of a new set of leaders offered some degree of hope for a 
lasting accommodation of the conflicting sides. 
 
The open discussion which followed contained a very rich variety of 
perspectives where participants drawing on their own academic and 
personal experiences were able to draw out lessons and best practice 
solutions to the Palestinian situation. 
 
Saturday 10 March 2018 
The Case of Germany and of South Africa 
Speaker: Ralf Wűstenberg, Flensburg/Cambridge 
Building on his previous theoretical and empirical work, Prof 
Wűstenberg’s presentation addressed several key questions related 
to the refining of the conditions of trust. His initial focus was the 
systemic change which accompanied the German reunification 
process. A critical concern was whether amnesty required forgiveness. 
Three ideal type different approaches to any post-conflict transitional 
period were introduced and evaluated and the speaker argued that 
Germany was a good example of the third type of transition where a 
large element of continuity was underpinned by a truth commission, 
narratives of suffering and victimhood, and admissions of guilt and 
forgiveness which led to a degree of political reconciliation. The 
question was raised as to how far one could expect spiritual or 
religious precepts of forgiveness and reconciliation to work across into 
the political realm so as to achieve full restitution and the audience 
were reminded that a fundamental element of the whole 
reconciliation and unification process was the salience of personal 
responsibility and forgiveness. 
 
The focus then switched to how dimensions of truth telling itself could 
be applied from the German and RSA cases to Palestine. The RSA Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission experience was applauded as an 
exemplar of how to allow individuals from a wide range of 
backgrounds to contribute authentic commentaries and to name 
perpetrators of injustice. The cold facts that more than 20,000 victim 
stories occupied 80 pages in the TRC Final Report, meant that the 
public record bore witness to the suffering which Apartheid had 
occasioned. The TRC experience also provided a profound insight, 
namely that human dignity is inviolable.  
 However, the whole essence of the German and RSA comparison was 
to transfer the lessons of such experiences to the Palestinian issue and 
on this Prof Wűstenberg was convinced that the preconditions for 
reconciliation were still unclear and consequently Palestine would 
remain in transition. On a broader front relating to any conflict or post-
conflict reconstruction he drew attention to the different levels of self-
knowledge where reconciliation within oneself was a sine qua non for 
coming to terms with the past.  
 
Respondent: Ashraf Y Suliman, South African Ambassador to 
Palestine. 
The Ambassador rehearsed several of the key events which have 
influenced the current situation within a post-apartheid RSA and drew 
attention to the role which exiled political activists, international 
organisations and the international system had had on the overthrow 
of Apartheid. 
 
Two signal insights demanded our attention, namely at a systematic 
level how do you deal with the victims of Apartheid and at a personal 
level, the plea of one mother addressing the TRC who asked why did 
my son die? He argued that although the TRC has several flaws, the 
RSA had devised a method of dealing with its tumultuous past. 
 
When seeking to apply some evidence from RSA to Palestine, it was 
observed that while the systematic control of workers and residents’ 
movement within and between the territories is oppressive, there 
were grounds for arguing that positive elements were present which 
could be used as a springboard for securing a more prosperous 
existence. Chief of these was a vibrant private sector and a sense of 
vitality within the community. Some of the hope which the 
Ambassador witnessed was provided by various religious leaders and 
people of good will. 
 
The general discussion revolved around the possibility that hegemonic 
narratives, far from being locked in to the past, could be rewritten, but 
unlike RSA and Germany, the intransigent problem for Israel-Palestine 
was that a single shared space was claimed simultaneously, both on 
settlement and historic grounds, but also more significantly from 
religious precedents and divine claims which were seemingly 
intractable. In that sense the Palestinian case was of a different order 
from that of Germany and the RSA. 
 
A very influential insight was the differentiation between rhetoric and 
poetic narratives in the construction of a plurality of interpretation. 
Different consequences flow from the narrative discourse which is 
constructed, and this communicates both obvious and subliminal 
messages as to what counts as legitimate and authentic. It also marks 
what issues are not subject to disputation. The theme of narrative 
construction and reinterpretation became a well-used paradigm 
throughout the workshop and would repay additional work in any 
conflict analysis. 
 
Turning from narratives to international perceptions, it was argued 
that Palestinians were increasingly isolated and marginalised within 
the international community and that for two reasons. First the Syrian 
conflict had overshadowed the Palestinian question and secondly 
globalisation and changing economic relations had damaged external 
prospects for aid and trade, for Palestinians could no longer depend 
unquestionably on former supporters and partners, such as China and 
India, who of late have built stronger relationships with Israel for 
largely commercial and logistical reasons. As a consequence, the 
dominant mood of the discussion, that only a Palestinian generated 
solution would provide a lasting answer to tension, was increasingly 
reinforced by structural trends within the region and beyond.  
 
A final insight was the discussion between structure and agency. 
Having spent most of the time debating geo-strategic, international 
legal and civil society issues, there emerged a strong yearning for a 
new set of actors and leaders so that Mandela-like strong, charismatic 
and forgiving personalities would conduct more consensual relations 
within the  Palestine-Israel context. 
 
The Case of Northern Ireland 
Dr Maria Power, University of Liverpool 
Dr Power’s core argument was that grassroots, bottom up pressure is 
the key to reconciliation and inter-community tensions. It was argued 
that conventional political structures have a tendency to fail, whereas 
peace on the ground mediated by local communities is ongoing and 
fundamental. 
 
We were reminded that the political structure and process provided 
by the Good Friday Agreement on 10th April 1998, whilst widely 
welcomed as a mechanism for peace building, was initially short lived 
due to the Omagh bombing of the 15th August 1998. The 
consociational democratic approach which survived in largely 
utilitarian mode following the establishment of power sharing, was 
not without its own structural strains and in the past year has given 
way to internal arguments, the breakdown of devolved government 
and the reimposition of direct rule from Westminster. 
 
We were also reminded that the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement was 
premature, while the Good Friday Agreement provided a vision of the 
kind of values a common society would uphold. This is because most 
of the grievances and preconditions to a full settlement were agreed 
in statute by both the British and Irish governments. Consequently, a 
stable and relatively prosperous period has ensued where new 
investment, infrastructural developments, and the establishment of 
both North-South and East-West bodies have created a new set of 
economic and political realities. Doubtless these relationships will be 
strained in the run-up to Brexit and even more perhaps after Spring 
2019 should an unsatisfactory border and trade relationship 
characterise the transition period. 
 
But what of full reconciliation? It was argued that Duncan Morrow’s 
(2016) definition of reconciliation was seen to be a realistic 
interpretation which recognises the ongoing difficulty of securing 
mutual trust. This was illustrated in physical space terms by reference 
to the ‘peace walls’ of Belfast, the interfaces which act as shatter belts 
between communities of hurt and suffering. Far from being only 
symbols of separation such interfaces could be transformed into loci 
of association. Here, the presenter used Lederach’s tripartite 
interpretation of the path towards reconciliation as a framework by 
which localised interactions could be interpreted. This is because the 
presenter valued community interaction above political antagonism. 
A safe space for faith-based communities was applauded as a means 
of getting to understand, empathise, and grow respect for previously 
oppositional communities. The peace-line ecumenical interventions 
used dialogue through prayer to harness the good will of the local 
religious organisations. 
Details were given of various religious outreach initiatives which were 
treated as models of Christian reconciliation. The pioneering work 
they undertake includes prayer and outreach, community relations 
and social action projects in localised spaces, intimate interactions and 
listening communities, which are largely female in personnel. Thus, as 
illustration, the Lamb of God community provided a one stop shop for 
trust and practical ministry for local people, which included 
counselling for victims of violence. A change of gear heralded Christian 
outreach and approaches to engaging with hard politics, ‘the more 
serious work of understanding identities’, for both communities felt 
estranged when faced with the political institutions and 
representative politics as illustrated by Stormont. 
Local, rather than sub-state or international initiatives were seen as 
providing the most promising seeds for reconciliation. Indeed, it was 
concluded that a grant-dependent peace industry, driven on by short 
term goals and cycles which does not allow any permanent 
reproduction of good practice, is a major weakness of the 
internationalisation of the conflict. Thus, despite progress and all the 
good intentions of many of the parties involved, the presentation 
concluded that it would seem all but impossible to construct a shared 
narrative as a basis for a renewed future. 
 
Respondent: Maria Palme, University of Jena 
The first substantive point made by Maria Palme was that seen in a 
comparative perspective Northern Ireland would seem to represent a 
positive outcome of a transition process. In the German case, by 
contrast, the short transitional period following reunification did not 
assuage feelings of frustration and grievance, especially against those 
who were involved in the security apparatus and police force and the 
lack of continuity meant that there was little room for a shared 
narrative drawn from the past.  
 
The marginalisation and partial erasure of the East German identity 
after forty years, has caused a deep fracture in the reconciliation 
process. The cutting edge of this was the introduction of new actors 
within the administration of the unified state and the 80% 
replacement of East German by West German civil servants. 
Consequently the accompanying lack of continuity created a barrier 
for the construction of relationships of trust. 
 
However, a common civil rights tradition and community 
empowerment mobilisation characterised both German and Northern 
Irish cases. The more contested narrative after reunification was that 
there was no truth without reconciliation, which needed both 
perspectives to recognise that in fact there is no reconciliation without 
truth.  
 
In open discussion, when the temporal element was considered,  it 
was observed that both the diaspora and future generations have 
different perspectives on the past conflict and should be incorporated 
into any new or revised interpretation of contemporary German 
history. 
 
It was also observed that greater effort needs to be undertaken to 
search for historical common similarities which characterised 
relations between communities which had drifted into conflict. A 
classic illustration derived from British imperialism was the 
consideration that as both India and Pakistan, have a common, shared 
past and similar experiences as victims of colonialism; this past could 
be used as potentially fruitful basis for future reconciliation, involving 
a reconstructed narrative of similarity. 
 
In a return to the fundamentals of life and shared experiences it was 
noted that among largely working-class neighbourhoods of Belfast 
and Derry chronic unemployment, mental health issues and the 
shared experience of poverty was not enough to overcome the politics 
of difference and continued differentiation in Northern Ireland. 
 
How is trust achieved? In the Israeli case, the difficulties entailed by 
the Holocaust and on-going vulnerability due to security breaches are 
often mirrored within the Palestinian communities by their refusal to 
accept aspects of their own past experiences, while such self-
censorship hinders an open discussion.  
 
It was also advised that grass-root initiatives should not be allowed to 
be dominated by politicians who have a hidden or different agenda, 
and in the case of Palestine it was argued this it was only by mobilising 
community activists and not professional politicians and leaders alone 
that a long-term solution could be conceived and implemented. 
 
Rather than search for a common narrative based on a past shared 
experience, Dr Power suggested that what was needed was for all 
people to develop a set of critical skills by which they could read the 
past and articulate the messages, values and perceptions with which 
they are presented. It was acknowledge however that a salient 
problem with the common past perspective was that it gets in the way 
of a shared/joined attention by which the future can be navigated. 
 
Is peace, peace for all, or just peace for some, especially if in some 
contexts the security and police service are left largely intact? The 
suspicion was that if left intact such agents of the state could 
perpetuate structural tensions. 
 
A final insight was not to undervalue the role of the international 
community, whose often self-interested interventions and actions 
often perceive and use the Palestinian cause as an extension of their 
own foreign policy, trade, commercial and geo-strategic advantage. 
 
The Case of Rwanda 
Speaker: Dr Gerd Hankel, Hamburg 
Basic demographic and geographical facts were presented as an 
introduction to the Rwandan case of genocide, where 500,000 Tutsi 
were killed primarily by Hutu. After the genocide many Tutsu exiles 
returned and as a consequence about 2 million Hutu fled to Tanzania 
and Zaire for fear of their lives. In the post-genocide period, post 1994 
violence continued as a means of ‘pacification’ while the new regime 
made many incursions into neighbouring states to quell pockets of 
resistance. 
 
The key issue raised was how does a former governing minority react 
to its own overthrow and search for restitution within a renewed 
society. The dominant message from several other contexts such as 
RSA was that ‘the truth heals’. It helps lay the foundation for a post-
reconstruction revitalisation. In post 1994 Rwanda, the new 
government sought to establish a new state together with a new 
shared vision where a common identity was forged, according to a 
new strategy. Within a reconciled society stronger economic and 
educational initiatives helped add to the quality of life. Today it was 
asserted there have been vast improvements in the socioeconomic life 
of the society. 
 
However, the judicial process still created some inconsistencies. Thus, 
an attempt was made to end impunity by judging those who were 
culpable of the genocide acts. Gacaca courts hosted by lay judges, 
represent a communal system of justice. Between 2002 and 2012 
more than a million people were prosecuted and sentenced as an 
attempt to restore harmony and prosecute crimes committed 
between October 1st 1990 and December 1994. 70% of all convicted 
people belonged to category 3 crimes and 5% to category 1%. In 2012 
Kagame judged the Gacaca courts to have been successful. 
 
The strengths of the mechanism were the ability to try cases at greater 
speed than international courts; greater transparency promoting 
truth and dialogue; the reintegration of perpetrators into the society. 
The weaknesses were that the government controlled the files, the 
proceedings and directly influenced the judges; it was a one-sided 
form of justice and represented the victor’s justice, because only 
genocide crimes, not the crimes of the invading army were addressed. 
The court system was also used as a tool to eliminate critics of the 
concept of the new Rwanda. In sum Dr Hankel argued that this 
mechanism gave Rwanda a form of truth commission without truth, 
for if those presumed guilty were willing to admit a series of crimes 
they could by their co-operation, receive a reduced sentence as a 
reward for complicity.  
 On balance the Gacaca court system was a dynamic illustration of 
grounded, bottom-up justice. However, such courts could not be 
referred to as a form of transitional justice, for refining trust remained 
an unachievable ideal, because the conflicting narratives are not 
compatible. The minority is protected by the state and the 
international community, while for the Hutu majority, there is little 
chance of restoring either their reputation or securing reconciliation 
as the experience of genocide was so horrendous. Of major concern 
was the manner in which two apparently similar atrocities had 
different outcomes for the perpetrators. In judicial terms the 
definition of an act as either a crime of genocide or a crime against 
humanity had real, deep seated implications, both positive and 
negative for the two types of perpetrators and their victims. 
 
Respondent: Plenum 
One significant intervention was that the acknowledgement of their 
crimes by the perpetrators was an important part of the reconciliation 
process, for a degree of ambiguity was replaced by some degree of 
empirical certainty, a degree of closure for the families of the victims. 
This practice could perhaps be reproduced in other contexts, such as 
the Palestinian case. 
 
Whilst acknowledging the primacy of bottom-up mobilisation, Dr 
Hankel introduced a possible solution by reference to an authoritarian 
top-down military solution aka Rwanda being adopted in Israel so as 
to bring some order to the situation. However, this was not his 
personal preference merely an observation drawn from the Rwandan 
episode. Other than that, it was observed that there would be little to 
be gleaned as lessons from Rwanda to the Israeli-Palestinian situation. 
 However, a lasting problem in Rwanda and Israel-Palestine is the 
question of victimhood which has yet to be fully addressed. 
 
Grass root initiatives challenging the official record is a permanent 
reminder that to a limited extent people can still exercise some power 
and influence, despite all the difficulties and this is particularly the 
case for the role of women acting en mass as critics of regimes in such 
distinct contexts as Argentina, Northern Ireland and the RSA. 
 
Final Remarks and Conclusion 
The Chair reminded the workshop that both the creation and 
successful implementation of strategies at all levels within the political 
hierarchy are largely determined by the answer to the question as to 
what counts as a lasting settlement? 
 
In anticipating further discussion and co-operation in the future he 
suggested that it would be advisable to host a similar gathering where 
there would be a focus on Israel and on a variety of Jewish 
perspectives. It would also be beneficial to augment the current 
findings by conducting more intensive work on the following: 
1. The role of territory, safe spaces, controlled access and 
boundary adjustments. 
2. The continued fine line between violent and non-violent political 
activism as an instrument for political mobilisation.  
3. An analysis and re-evaluation as to what partial solutions work, 
why, and for how long?  
4. The manner in which successive generations repeat the 
behaviour of previous generations, even if the mobilising issues 
change over time? 
5. Economic aspects of peace building and reconciliation.  
6. Social programmes which derive from the recognition of the 
‘other’ in terms of the language of statutory education and 
Higher Education; this involves teacher training, rewriting text 
books and resources for effective pedagogy; learning a 
previously discriminated language is not the same process as 
using that language in an optimum number of domains, 
especially true within local government, the health sector and 
social services. Thus, public services in a differentiated language 
(e.g. Irish) should best be seen not as a sop to the dissenting 
community, but as forming part of a public good agenda. 
 
In thanking the participants and organisers Professor Williams 
concluded that the workshop had demonstrated that the struggle to 
promote reconciliation, let alone achieve equality of status, between 
contending parties is challenging, constant and unending. Further, 
political leadership is crucial at whatever level in the socio-political 
hierarchy - and even the most detailed and well-constructed 
programmes for peace-building can come unstuck if elements lack 
conviction or actors feel that they have been marginalised or 
structurally discriminated against by hegemonic partners to any 
agreement. 
 
Third, for some, positive rhetoric, substantive discourse and symbols 
are inspiring and can overcome the inherently exasperating nature of 
international and domestic rules, regulations, requirements and 
obligations. However, permanent consensus at the local level 
mediated by bottom-up mobilisation cannot sustain a people 
indefinitely without the top-down prospects of peace and 
reconstruction, but for far too many people caught up in conflict and 
post-conflict situations, this is what gives meaning to their daily life 
and must be the platform upon which a hope for better prospects is 
built. 
 
Fourth, local administrative leadership is often just as important as 
political leadership, thus recalcitrant managers in fields such as 
education, health care, employment and housing provision, can slow 
down reform while purposive managers can implement 
recommendations with conviction resulting in a strategy, an action 
plan and demonstrable results. 
 
Fifth, respect is the essential value for any organisation involved in 
post-conflict reconciliation: respect for citizens, for institutions, for 
public servants, and for politicians. Yet but ultimately respect is so 
often culture-bound that it is nigh on impossible to manufacture, so 
perhaps a more realistic virtue would be mutual accommodation as a 
more realisable goal in the first period of co-creative programmes for 
lasting peace. 
 
Sixth, appropriate resource investment and infra-structural 
development are essential if there is to be a financial guarantee of the 
political, human right and policy agreements. Pronouncing co-equality 
of treatment without the capacity to deliver the attendant 
programmes is a sure-fire way of prolonging or reigniting grievance-
based opposition. 
 
Seventh, policy recommendations need to be framed in a way that 
bureaucrats can understand and implement them. Thus, following 
periods of relative peace and consensus building we need to be able 
to evaluate the real behavioural, political and socio-economic changes 
brought about by conflict-resolution measures, both to reassure 
interested parties and to contribute to best-practice principles. 
 
Eighth, time is critical, over the medium and the long term, both to 
allow healing and reconstruction, but also because continued 
intransigence can reopen old wounds, redefine long-standing issues 
as current crucial priorities and allow for memories to be reactivated 
by pressing, instrumental factors. 
 
A classic example of this is the Good Friday Agreement signed on 10th 
April 1998, but only fully implemented in May 2007. For although it 
has brought peace and prosperity there are again current concerns 
expressed by many, and voiced by former Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern 
(1997-2008) on March 8th, 2018 during the Brian Lenihan memorial 
lecture at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, that a hard border 
between North and South following Brexit could precipitate a fresh 
eruption of violence by dissidents. 
 
Ninth, the narratives reproduced by both official records and 
independent academic historians and other scholars, writing 
sometime after the real-world events, may seem at variance with the 
recollections, perceptions and memories of the participants involved. 
This is because there is a tendency to rationalise, to sanitise and to 
impose trajectories upon a context which may undervalue the 
emotional, conflictual and irrational bases for behaviour. It almost 
certainly underplays the impact which chance, serendipity and the 
idiosyncratic nature of key actors has on the final outcomes and the 
search for lasting peace. 
 
In concluding the VHI organisers thanked the participants for their 
valuable contributions and announced that it was proposed that a 
follow-up workshop would be convened in the Spring of 2019. 
 
 
 
